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Abstract
We conduct a ﬁeld experiment in a large real-world social network to examine how subjects
expect to be treated by their friends and by strangers who make allocation decisions in modi-
ﬁed dictator games. While recipients’ beliefs accurately account for the extent to which friends
will choose more generous allocations than strangers (i.e. directed altruism), recipients are not
able to anticipate individual diﬀerences in the baseline altruism of allocators (measured by
giving to an unnamed recipient, which is predictive of generosity towards named recipients).
Recipients who are direct friends with the allocator, or even recipients with many common
friends, are no more accurate in recognizing intrinsically altruistic allocators. Recipient be-
liefs are signiﬁcantly less accurate than the predictions of an econometrician who knows the
allocator’s demographic characteristics and social distance, suggesting recipients do not have
information on unobservable characteristics of the allocator.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C73, C91, D64
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1 Introduction
Recent research has shown that altruistic preferences are enormously heterogenous: some subjects
behave perfectly selﬁshly while other subjects aim for equitable or socially eﬃcient allocations.1
In this paper, we analyze whether an agent’s altruistic preferences should be viewed as part of her
private information, or whether it is more appropriate to think of altruism as a publicly observed
characteristic such as gender or age.
Ample anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals invest considerable resources in revealing
altruistic preferences: for example, research institutes, charitable foundations, sport and cultural
facilities are frequently named after their founders. Non-proﬁt organizations have developed vari-
ous mechanisms to allow donors to endow department chairs at universities, assign their names to
library books and other equipment such as chairs and desks or to be listed on a commemorative
plaque for a new building. It is an open question whether this technologies are successful in
revealing agents’ altruism. Should we think of all this ostensible signaling as a separating equilib-
rium of some signaling game as in Benabou and Tirole (2006)? If such a separating equilibrium
is present, then it must be the case that an individuals friends know whether he or she is in fact
altruistic. In particular, the individuals altruism should be reﬂected in beliefs about the kinds of
allocation decisions he or she would make. If instead people are not aware of which of their friends
are particularly altruistic or particularly selﬁsh, this suggests that such attempts at signaling are
ineﬀective and that only a pooling equilibrium may be feasible where agents act generously at
times in order to not be revealed as a selﬁsh type.
It is natural to expect that an agent can observe the altruistic preferences of a friend more
easily than the preferences of a stranger. We conduct a large ﬁeld experiment within a real-world
social network where we measure subjects’ beliefs about the altruism of friends and strangers.2.
In Leider, Mobius, Rosenblat and Do (2009) we show that altruistic preferences in a social net-
work can be decomposed into a baseline altruism component and a directed altruism component.
1Andreoni and Miller (2002) ﬁrst documented that altruistic preferences towards strangers adhere to standard
revealed preference axioms and Fisman, Kariv and Markovits (2007) reﬁne their methodology by increasing the
number of observations per agent.
2A growing literature in economics has explored learning in social networks; see Calvo-Armengol and Jackson
(2004) and DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) for recent theoretical contributions and Kremer and Miguel
(2007) and Rao, Mobius and Rosenblat (2007) for examples of ﬁeld experiments on social learning.
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Baseline altruism describes the intrinsic niceness of a decision-maker. Directed altruism captures
the fact that conditional on the decision-maker’s baseline altruism she will tend to treat friends
better than strangers. In this paper we speciﬁcally analyze to what extent agents are aware of
other people’s baseline altruism - in particular, we are interested whether they are aware of the
baseline altruism of their close friends.
In our experiments, we ﬁrst directly measure the social network of Harvard undergraduates
to identify, for each subject, socially close direct friends, less close friends-of-friends, and socially
distant strangers. We then conduct a series of modiﬁed dictator games where allocators make
unilateral allocation decisions for a nameless recipient (a randomly selected participant from the
subject’s dormitory) and, a few days later, for several types of named recipients. Participants
make multiple decisions but are paid for one decision selected at random. Our design allows us
to distinguish between baseline altruism towards nameless recipients and directed altruism that
favors friends over nameless recipients. We ﬁnd that allocators pass, on average, about 50% more
tokens to friends compared to nameless recipients. Moreover, the amount sent to a nameless
recipient is an excellent predictor of how much the same allocator will send in the future to a
friend: each one-unit increase in nameless allocation translates approximately into a one-unit
increase in allocations to friends. We then measure recipients beliefs of how many tokens diﬀerent
named allocators will pass to them.3
Our main ﬁnding is that subjects are remarkably unaware of the baseline altruism of people
they know – including their close friends. We ﬁnd that recipients’ beliefs are, on average, very well
calibrated for the population as a whole: they correctly expect that friends pass more tokens than
strangers and the expected average amounts passed are close to the actual amounts. However,
recipients do not incorporate an allocator’s baseline altruism into their prediction: they expect
more tokens from friends than from strangers but they do not expect more tokens from generous
friends compared to selﬁsh friends. For some allocator/recipients pairs we observe both the
allocator’s action for a particular recipient as well as that recipient’s belief for this particular
allocator. We again ﬁnd that recipients have no private information about allocators’ decisions
except that, on average, they expect more tokens from friends compared to strangers. This is true
3While we want to measure the eﬀect of the network structure on beliefs, we never explicitly refer to social
distance in instructions, but rather prompt recipients by the names of allocators.
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even if allocator and recipient are direct friends or even if they have many friends in common.
Therefore, it appears that recipients have no greater knowledge about allocators’ altruistic
preferences in the social network than the econometrician who has measured the social network
and demographic characteristics of allocators. While recipients correctly expect, on average, that
friends will treat them better than strangers they are unaware of the considerable and stable
heterogeneity in allocators’ preferences.
Our paper builds on a rich experimental literature on prosocial behavior. Most experi-
ments match randomly selected subjects anonymously in the lab4 and are therefore unsuitable
to study the recipient’s beliefs about socially close allocators. A number of studies measure be-
liefs after revealing certain demographic characteristics about allocators such as gender (Slonim
and Garbarino 2008, Aguiar, Bran˜as-Garza, Cobo-Reyes, Jime´nez and Miller 2009), ethnicity
(Fershtman and Gneezy 2001) and work place or address (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and
Soutter 2000). To the best of our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst to measure recipients’ beliefs
in a real-world social network. In Leider et al. (2009) we conduct other experiments with the
same subject pool to distinguish directed altruism between socially close subjects from norms of
reciprocity that are supported by the repeated super-game played between subjects in the social
network. In subsequent research, Goeree, McConnell, Mitchell, Tromp and Yariv (2008) use our
design to measure directed altruism in a school network of teenage girls (also see Bran˜as-Garza,
Cobo-Reyes, Paz Espinosa, Jime´nez and Ponti (2006) for experimental data with European uni-
versity students). While these studies conﬁrm our ﬁndings of directed altruism, they do not
measure beliefs about expected generosity of others. In an important methodological advance,
our experiment was completely web-based. This ensured very high participation rate of 71%,
which was crucial for generating a good social network map, as well as a suﬃcient number of
matches between direct friends during the course of the experiment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The experimental design is described in section 2.
Section 3 summarizes the main features of the data. In section 4 we show that recipients have no
knowledge of allocators’ altruistic preferences. Section 5 concludes by discussing the implications
of our results and avenues for future research.
4See Camerer (2003) for an extensive survey.
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2 Experimental Design
Our design has two stages: a network measurement stage, and a dictator game stage. Each
allocator in the dictator game stage made multiple allocation decisions for 6 diﬀerent recipients
but was paid only for one randomly selected decision at the end of the experiment.5 Similarly,
each recipient submitted multiple beliefs for 7 diﬀerent potential allocators but was paid only for
the accuracy of one of her predictions.
2.1 Network Measurement
To measure the social network, we used a coordination task to provide subjects incentives to
truthfully report their friendships. Each subject listed her 10 best friends and the average amount
of time per week she spends with each of them.6 For each listed friend who also listed the subject,
the subject was paid 50 cents with probability 0.5 if their answers about time spent together
disagree, or with probability 0.75 if they agree. We made the expected payoﬀ (25 or 37.50 cents)
large enough to give an incentive to list their friends truthfully and small enough to discourage
“gaming”. The randomization was included to limit disappointment if a subject was only named
by a few people. To deﬁne the social network, we say that two subjects have a direct link if one
of them named the other person. We call this type of social network the “OR-network”.7
2.2 Allocators
After measuring the social network, we randomly assigned each subject the role of allocator or
recipient in the dictator games.8 Each allocator received an e-mail invitation with a link to a
website where she could play modiﬁed dictator games with a nameless recipient randomly selected
from the allocator’s dormitory.9 The allocator was asked to divide 50 tokens between herself and
5The decisions were selected such that each recipient was also only paid once. This was explained to all
participants.
6The choices were 0-30 minutes, 30 minutes to 1 hour, 1-2 hours, 2-4 hours, 4-8 hours or more than 8 hours.
7We ﬁnd similar results when we use the “AND-network”, where a link exists only if both subjects name each
other. The OR-network deﬁnition has desirable monotonicity properties: a subject with an above average number
of actual friends will have an above average number of friends in the measured network even when the network
survey truncates his true network. This is not always true for the AND-network if truncation forces subjects to
randomly select from a set of equally close friends.
8In the experimental instructions, we referred to two roles simply as player 1 and player 2.
9The allocator is told in the instructions that the recipient was selected from her dormitory.
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the recipient under three diﬀerent token-money exchange rates (for the allocator and recipient
respectively). In the ﬁrst condition giving is eﬃcient, each token is worth 10 cents to the allocator,
but is worth 30 cents to the recipient (an exchange rate of 1:3); in the second condition giving is
neutral, each token is worth 20 cents to the allocator and 20 cents to the recipient (an exchange
rate of 1:1); lastly, in the third condition giving is ineﬃcient, each token is worth 30 cents to the
allocator and only 10 cents to the recipient(an exchange rate of 3:1).
A few days later, all allocators were invited by e-mail to participate in a second round, in
which they are matched with ﬁve diﬀerent named recipients listed using their full real ﬁrst and
last names: (1) a direct friend (social distance SD = 1), (2) a friend of a friend (SD = 2), (3) a
friend of a friend of a friend (SD = 3), (4) a student in the same staircase/ﬂoor who is at least
distance 4 removed from the student (SD ≥ 4), and (5) a randomly selected student from the
same dormitory who falls into none of the above categories.10 In each case, the allocator was
asked to make allocation decisions under the three diﬀerent exchange rates for each recipient. To
control for experimenter demand eﬀects of presentation, we randomized both the order and the
grouping (by social distance) of subjects’ decisions.
Note that each allocator made 18 decisions (3 decisions for the nameless and 5 named recipi-
ents). All these decisions were anonymous: neither the recipient nor the allocator was told which
of the decisions was selected for payment. On top of this, allocators also made 18 non-anonymous
decisions: they were identical to the anonymous decisions except that both allocator and recipient
were informed if one of these decisions was selected for payment. In this paper we report only on
anonymous decisions, since we want to explain beliefs, and these are the decisions we have beliefs
for.11. The large number of decisions made it very diﬃcult for participants to infer which of her
anonymous decisions was selected for payment.12
10Our selection algorithm used the “AND”-network deﬁnition for this step. Since social distance always (weakly)
decreases when using the “OR”-social distance deﬁnition the number of observations for columns 1 to 4 in tables
1 and 2 are not equal.
11In Leider et al. (2009) we examine (and compare) both the anonymous and non-anonymous decisions in order
to explain the determinants of allocator choices.
12While in principle the allocator could reveal her allocation to the recipient after the experiment in the anonymous
case, since the allocator was not told which decision was selected for payment, she would have had to make choices
with unique payoﬀs so that she would know which recipient to inform, and remember those choices several weeks
later when payments were made.
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2.3 Recipients
We measured recipients beliefs of how many tokens 5 diﬀerent named allocators would pass
to them in the anonymous treatment.13 Recipients in the network population received an e-mail
invitation to participate in a single web-based experiment where the recipient was asked to predict
how many tokens, out of 50 total tokens, 5 diﬀerent allocators (whose real names were presented
to the recipient) would pass to the recipient under each of three exchange rates (1:3, 1:1, and
3:1) in the anonymous treatment. For each recipient we chose the 5 allocators in the same way
as we assigned recipients to allocators: one randomly selected direct friend, one friend of a friend
(SD = 2), one friend of a friend of a friend (SD = 3), a student in the same staircase/ﬂoor who
is at least distance 4 removed from the student, and a randomly selected student from the same
dormitory who falls into none of the above categories.14 The recipient was told that at most one
of these 15 decisions would be selected for payment.
For each token above or below the actual allocation, 10 cents were subtracted from the recipi-
ent’s earnings. Therefore, the recipient had incentives to report his median belief (see Mobius and
Rosenblat (2006)). In many lab experiments, beliefs are more commonly elicited using a quadratic
loss function which provides incentives for subjects to reveal mean beliefs (Costa-Gomes and
Weizsa¨cker 2007, Huck 2002). For the sake of keeping the instruction for our online experiment
as simple as possible we opted for an absolute deviation loss function. Since we are primarily
interested in studying how recipients change their beliefs to account for the social distance and
the baseline altruism of diﬀerent allocators, we are not concerned about this diﬀerence.
3 Data Description
3.1 Subject Pool
In December 2003, Harvard sophomores, juniors and seniors at two dormitories were recruited
through posters, ﬂyers, and mail invitation. Experimental earnings were added to the students’
13We also asked recipients how many tokens 2 named allocators would pass to 2 other named recipients. Therefore,
each recipients submitted beliefs for 7 diﬀerent allocator/recipient pairs but only in 5 out of these 7 cases was the
recipient himself. We are not using data from the other 2 pairs in this paper.
14Due to this selection procedure, if a recipient was asked to submit a belief for a particular allocator then the
allocator did not necessarily submit a decision for that recipient (and vice versa).
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electronic cash-cards.15 Subjects who logged onto the website were asked to (1) list their best
friends’ names using the coordination task and (2) ﬁll in a basic demographic questionnaire.
Subjects were required to name friends from the two participating dormitories. Subjects were
paid their earnings from the coordination task, plus a ﬂat payment of $10 for completing the
survey. They were also eligible to earn cash prizes in a raﬄe, adding $3 (on average) in earnings.
In those two dormitories, 569 of the 806 students, or about 71%, participated in the social
network survey. The survey netted 5690 one-way links. The resulting “OR”-network consists of
a single connected component with 802 subjects. Fifty-one percent of subjects in the baseline
survey were women; 49% were men. Thirty-one percent of the subjects were sophomores, 30%
were juniors and 39% were seniors.
The dictator game stage was conducted over a one-week period in May 2004. Half of all
subjects who participated in the coordination stage were randomly selected to be allocators. Out
of 284 eligible allocators invited, 193 participated in round 1 (decisions for nameless recipients)
and 181 participated in round 2 (decisions for named recipients). Participants were representative
of the coordination stage sample composition: 58% were women, 28% were sophomores, 28% were
juniors, and 44% were seniors. The corresponding statistics for recipients are similar.
3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows the average allocations in the three dictator games. It is apparent that across all
exchange rates allocators’ generosity towards the recipient decreases with social distance. With
a 1:3 exchange rate, allocators pass about 19.19 tokens to a direct friend versus 12.20 tokens to a
recipient at social distance 4. With an exchange rate of 3:1, the allocator passes only 8.03 versus
6.15 tokens, respectively.
We can interpret allocations to nameless recipients as allocators’ baseline or unconditional
generosity, since the allocator has no information about the recipient. Our data replicates the
well-known ﬁnding of Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman et al. (2007) that individuals are
highly heterogenous in their unconditional altruism. In particular, we also ﬁnd that many subjects
are perfectly selﬁsh: in the three exchange rates 28, 46, and 64% of subjects pass zero tokens,
15These cards are widely used on campus as a cash substitute, and many oﬀ-campus merchants accept the cards.
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respectively.
Recipients’ beliefs are reported in table 2. Beliefs are fairly accurate and correctly anticipate
the eﬀect of greater social distance16. Beliefs are most accurate when altruism is eﬃcient (1:3
exchange rate). When altruism is ineﬃcient, recipients expect allocators to be somewhat more
generous than they actually are.
4 Results
4.1 Allocator Altruism
We begin by examining the determinants of allocator’s decisions, to obtain an estimate of baseline
and directed altruism. This will provide a benchmark we can later use for comparison with the
recipients’ beliefs. We report the estimates for a simple linear empirical model of altruism in
social networks taken from our earlier paper on allocator decisions (Leider et al. 2009):17
Allocation = α∗demographic characteristics+γ1∗social distance+γ2∗nameless allocation+. (1)
The dependent variable is the number of tokens passed by the allocator. The parameter γ1
captures the importance of directed altruism while γ2 captures the importance of the nameless
decision (baseline altruism) in predicting allocations to named recipients.
We exploit the fact that we observe 5 decisions for each allocator which allows us to estimate
equation 1 using random eﬀects. We also use Tobit regressions to take account of the fact that
allocations are bounded below by zero and above by 50.18 We control for the social distance
between allocator and recipient by including dummy variables SD1 (meaning a direct friend)
to SD4 with SD4 as omitted category. The estimated coeﬃcient on SD1 should therefore be
interpreted as the number of extra tokens that the allocator passes to a direct friend compared to
16Comparing recipient beliefs to actual allocations with a non-parametric signed-rank test we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
diﬀerences only for the 3:1 exchange rate with distance 3 (p = 0.007) and distance 4 (p = 0.021), as well as
marginal signiﬁcance for the 1:1 exchange rate with distance 3 (p = 0.053). For all other comparisons p > 0.20.
17Our model is a natural extension of existing preferences-based altruism models: Andreoni (1990) model altruism
as “warm glow”, while Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Charness and Rabin (2002)
focus on preferences over payoﬀ distributions.
18Our results are very similar when we estimate equation 1 using standard random eﬀects or ﬁxed eﬀects GLS.
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a distant recipient in the anonymous treatment, while the estimated coeﬃcient on SD2 captures
directed altruism towards a friend of friend.
The estimates are reported in table 3. Odd-numbered columns show estimates where we
only control for social distance while even numbered columns include demographic controls for
participants’ age, gender, whether they live in the same entryway as well the allocator’s baseline
altruism to nameless recipients. The two variables that consistently and strongly predict how
generously an allocator treats a recipient in her social network are social distance and generosity
towards nameless recipients.
Observation 1 Allocators who give more to nameless recipients also give more to specific named
recipients. The pass-through is close to 1.
Across all three exchange rates, each one token increase in generosity towards a nameless recipient
is associated with a 1.19 to 1.40 token increase in generosity towards a named recipient. Since
the nameless and the named allocations were elicited several days apart, this continuity indicates
a substantial degree of stability in the heterogeneity of allocators’ altruistic preferences over time.
Moreover, the fact that estimated pass-through from nameless to named allocations is close to 1
vindicates our interpretation of an allocator’s nameless allocation as her baseline altruism.19
Observation 2 Close social ties induce directed altruism. Allocations to friends are at least 50%
higher than allocations to nameless recipients.
Moreover, social distance also matters greatly: allocators are substantially more generous to direct
friends than to less socially close recipients. Generosity decreases quickly and monotonically with
social distance, although the estimated coeﬃcients on SD2 and SD3 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from each other for all games. In terms of magnitudes, allocators pass at least 50% more tokens
to friends than to nameless recipients.
Observation 3 Gender, years in college and geographic proximity do not predict allocation de-
cisions.
19D’Exelle and Riedl (2008) ﬁnd very similar results with a diﬀerent subject pool and a modiﬁed deﬁnition of
baseline altruism. They consider village networks in Nicaragua and measure giving to strangers in another village
instead of giving to a random person from the same social network (as in our paper). Additionally, as in our results,
they ﬁnd that the amount givent to strangers is similar to the amount given to friends-of-a-friend.
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Interestingly, demographic characteristics have, for the most part, no signiﬁcant eﬀect: the allo-
cator’s and recipient’s gender, as well as their geographic proximity, have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on
generosity.20 However, the signs of the estimated gender coeﬃcients of the allocator are consis-
tent with the work of Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), who found that men are more likely to
exhibit social-surplus maximizing preferences: they are more generous in dictator games when
giving is eﬃcient and less generous when giving is ineﬃcient. College juniors are somewhat more
selﬁsh than are sophomores and seniors; however, most of the coeﬃcients on the class dummies
are insigniﬁcant.21
4.2 The Determinants of Recipient Beliefs
We next look to recipient beliefs to examine what factors determine recipient beliefs. Since we do
not observe both an allocator choice and a recipient belief for every pairing, we will ﬁrst look at the
general pattern of beliefs. One way to consider the accuracy of recipient beliefs given the general
mechanisms that determine generosity is to reframe the previous section as the econometrician’s
predictions based on a model of the dictator game calibrated from allocation choices, knowledge
of the structure of the social network, and demographic characteristics. We can then ask whether
recipients’ beliefs correctly account for social ties and/or the intrinsic generosity of the allocator.
We also exmaine whether recipients are able to make better predictions than the econometrician
(due to any potential private information about unobserved characteristics of the allocator).
We assume that recipients use the same linear model of equation 1 as the econometrician but
we estimate it using recipients’ beliefs instead of allocators’ actions as dependent variable. We
also specify random eﬀects on the recipient level (rather than on the allocator level), since our
experiment provides us with multiple observations for each recipient.
The odd- and even-numbered columns in table 4 report our estimates with and without ad-
ditional covariates. Recipient beliefs are signiﬁcantly higher for direct friends (SD = 1) than for
strangers, and interestingly beliefs are also signiﬁcantly higher for friends of friends (SD = 2)
20Our experiment includes only a limited number of demographic variables. However, our results are consistent
with the results reported in Goeree et al. (2008) who include a much wider range of demographic variables.
21We also ran a version of the even numbered speciﬁcations which included dummy variables if the number of
subjects who had listed the allocator or the recipient, respectively, as a friend was higher than the median. These
were not signiﬁcant for any of the three dictator games.
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when giving is eﬃcient (as well as being marginally signiﬁcant when giving is neutral or ineﬃ-
cient). Recipients do not, however, have diﬀerent beliefs based on the baseline altruism of the
allocator. In order to compare the eﬀect of social distance and allocator type on beliefs to the
eﬀect on giving, we conduct a Wald test whether the coeﬃcient estimates in the beliefs regression
(from table 4) are equal to the closest point in the 95% conﬁdence interval for the corresponding
coeﬃcient from the allocation regression (3).22
Result 1 Recipients beliefs are well calibrated to directed altruism.
The number of extra tokens that recipients expect from their direct friends (SD = 1) is quite
close to the actual number of extra tokens allocators pass to their direct friends - in all cases
the estimated coeﬃcient is within the 95% conﬁdence interval of the allocation estimate. While
recipients are in general too optimistic about friends of friends when giving is eﬃcient or neutral
(expecting the generosity of allocators to increase by almost twice the actual amount), the beliefs
coeﬃcients are within the allocation conﬁdence interval for all six speciﬁcation. Similarly, the
coeﬃcient for SD = 3 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the allocation estimates (p > 0.65 in
all cases). Thus it appears that recipients are making approximately accurate adjustments to
their beliefs for the strength of the social tie they have with the allocator. In contrast, however,
recipients essentially ignore allocators’ baseline altruism.
Result 2 Recipients are unaware of allocators’ baseline altruism.
In all belief regressions the estimated coeﬃcients on nameless decisions are not only quite close
to zero, they are also signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the allocation estimates (p < 0.001 for all three
exchange rates). Thus, while each token given to a nameless recipient increases actual giving to
named recipients by nearly 1, recipients’ beliefs essentially do not diﬀer at all between allocators.
Thus, while recipients’ do account for the aggregate eﬀect of social distance, they do not seem to be
able to anticipate the individual heterogeneity in baseline altruism. Another way to demonstrate
that recipients are not making suﬃcient distinctions between their direct friends is to examine, for
22We are not aware of another method to more directly test the equality of two coeﬃcients from two Tobit
regressions with diﬀerent dependant variables. We believe that considering the whole conﬁdence interval is a
conservative way of accounting for the precision of the choice estimates.
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recipients that make predictions for more than one direct friend, whether the predicted allocations
diﬀer as much as they ought to given the distribution of actual allocations. For each recipient
who made a prediction for two or more direct friends we calculate the diﬀerence between their
largest prediction and their smallest. Similarly, for each recipient where we observe more than one
allocation from a friend, we calculate the diﬀerence between the largest and smallest allocation.
While we do not observe enough recipients with both enough predictions and enough allocations,
we can compare the distributions. For all three dictator games the median diﬀerence in beliefs
is much smaller than the median diﬀerence in allocations, i.e. a recipients predictions for her
friends are too similar.23 In the 1:3 dictator game the median diﬀerence for beliefs was 5 while
the median for allocations was 20 (ranksum test: p < 0.01); for the 1:1 game the median for
beliefs was 5 and for allocations was 24 (p < 0.01) while in the 3:1 game the medians were 3.5 and
12 respectively (p = 0.07). Moreover, for all three games the distribution of diﬀerences for actions
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the distribution of diﬀerences for beliefs, i.e. the diﬀerences
in beliefs are too small throughout the distribution.24
Lastly, as in the allocation estimates, none of the other demographic and geographic covariates
matter except for the allocator’s gender: recipients expect male allocators to be signiﬁcantly less
generous when giving is neutral (1:1 exchange rate), and especially when giving is ineﬃcient (3:1
exchange rate). Again, this result is consistent with Andreoni and Vesterlund’s (2001) ﬁndings.
Moreover, the estimated gender eﬀect is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than the estimates from the
allocation regression (the estimates are contained in the conﬁdence interval in all cases).
4.3 Accuracy of Recipient Beliefs
Having interpreted the allocation estimates as econometric predictions, one way that we can assess
the overall accuracy of recipient beliefs is to compare the mean squared error between predictions
and action for the econometrician and the recipient, since for 204 out of the 563 matches between
23If instead recipients were aware of the allocators’ baseline altruism but simply did not believe that baseline
altruism would aﬀect giving to named recipients, then we ought to observe recipients making substantially diﬀerent
predictions for diﬀerent direct friends.
24We use the stochastic dominance test from Anderson (1996) using 10 equally spaced partitions. For the 1:3
DG the test statistic is χ2(9) = 25.1 with p < 0.01; for the 1:1 DG χ2(9) = 24.2 with p < 0.01; for the 3:1 DG
χ2(9) = 19.0 with p = 0.03.) Similar results obtain if we instead use the standard deviation in beliefs/allocations
as our measure of diﬀerentiation.
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a speciﬁc recipient and an allocator we observe both a prediction and the allocator’s actual
choice. If the recipient were using some knowledge about the speciﬁc allocator to make her
prediction that was not available to the econometrician, then we may expect recipient predictions
to be more accurate than the econometrician. However, for all three exchange rates the mean
square error is approximately twice as large for the recipient beliefs as from our ﬁtted model
of allocator behavior25 (MSE(1:3) 448 vs 758; MSE(1:1) 156 vs 280; MSE(3:1) 173 vs 351) - a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in all cases (p < 0.001 in a signed rank test).26 Moreover, even if we restrict
attention to allocations by direct friends (SD = 1), where the recipient is most likely to have
better information than the econometrician, the recipients still make signiﬁcantly larger errors
(MSE(1:3) 549 vs 896, p = 0.02; MSE(1:1) 193 vs 297, p = 0.02; MSE(3:1) 238 vs 514, p < 0.01).
For the matches where we observe both a prediction and a choice, we can identify which
matches had the most inaccurate predictions. We regress the absolute diﬀerence between predic-
tion and actual choice on social distance and the number of tokens the allocator sent to a nameless
recipient, and report these results in the odd-numbered columns of table 5.
Result 3 Recipients made larger mistakes for highly altruistic allocators, underestimating their
choices.
Across all three dictator games, prediction errors were signiﬁcantly increasing in the baseline
altruism of the allocator. That is, recipients were much more accurate in prediction the choices
of relatively selﬁsh recipients than relatively altruistic recipients. In particular, when giving
was eﬃcient or neutral subjects were signiﬁcantly more likely to underestimate (rather than
overestimate) the choice of highly altruistic allocators (p < 0.01 for a signed-rank test of prediction
errors for allocators with the highest quartile of baseline altruism). Conversely, subjects were
signiﬁcantly more likely to overestimate the allocations of the most selﬁsh allocators in all three
dictator games (For allocators in the lowest quartile of baseline altruism p < 0.01 in all cases).
The eﬀect of social distance on errors is mixed: low social distance leads to signiﬁcantly larger
errors in the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient dictator games, while it leads to smaller errors when giving
is neutral.
25We use the speciﬁcations reported in the even-numbered columns which include all the demographic information.
26If instead we use the predictions from the odd-numbered columns, which include only social distance, the
recipient beliefs perform similarly poorly.
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One might expect that recipients are better at observing the behavior, and thus inferring
the preferences, of direct friends compared to socially more distant allocators. Therefore, we
re-estimate our empirical model and include an interaction term between the allocator’s nameless
decision and the social distance dummy SD1. The results are reported in the odd-numbered
columns of table 5 (without demographic and geographic covariates).
Result 4 Stronger social connections do not increase recipients’ awareness of allocator’s baseline
altruism.
We do not ﬁnd evidence that direct friends make signiﬁcantly smaller mistakes in predicting
the actions of highly altruistic allocators than strangers do, in fact in two of the speciﬁcations the
interaction term is positive.27 Thus it seems that direct friends are not any better at avoiding
errors due to individual heterogeneity in the altruism of allocators.28
If being a direct friend is not a suﬃcient source of information to successfully identify highly
altruistic allocators, we consider whether other measures of social connection might identify sub-
jects who are aware of individual diﬀerences between allocators. As an alternative measure, we
consider maximum network flow, deﬁned as the number of unique paths (of distance two or less)
between the allocator and recipient (Karlan, Mobius, Rosenblat and Szeidl 2009). This measure
captures the number of common friends the two subjects share (plus one if they are also direct
friends) and is also a measure of network closure (Coleman 1990). One may expect that subjects
may be most informed about individuals that they are more densely connected to in their circle
of friends. Therefore, we regress absolute prediction errors on network ﬂow and allocator baseline
altruism; the results are presented in the odd-numbered columns of table 6. For ease in interpret-
ing an interaction between network ﬂow and allocator altruism, in the even-numbered columns we
replace the continuous measure of ﬂow with a dummy variable denoting subjects with a network
27While the interaction term is negative (i.e. a smaller increase in errors for altruistic subjects), the large main
eﬀect of being a direct friend means the total eﬀect is positive for all allocators (and signiﬁcant for allocators up to
the 65th percentile of altruism).
28We also considered whether recipients were more accurate in accounting for the altruism of direct friends when
both subjects said they spent at least 2-4 hours a week together (compared to recipients who are direct friends of
the allocator but spend less time together). However, when we regressed prediction errors on a dummy for time
spent together, allocator altruism and term interacting time together with altruism, the interaction term was not
signiﬁcantly negative for any of the games. While the errors were signiﬁcantly increasing in baseline altruism only
for who spent a lot of time together in the neutral and ineﬃcient games, there was also a negative main eﬀect on
errors of the time spent together. There overall eﬀect was not consistent across games.
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ﬂow at least as large as the median ﬂow (among pairs with non-zero ﬂow). In all speciﬁcations
prediction errors are signiﬁcantly increasing in the allocators’ baseline altruism. Errors do not
signiﬁcantly diﬀer based on the network ﬂow between the allocator and recipient, nor are the
errors of high ﬂow recipients aﬀected less by the allocator’s baseline altruism.29 Thus it appears
that even subjects who have dense social connections with the allocator are not aware of which
allocators are highly altruistic.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we ask subjects how they expect to be treated by other speciﬁc individuals in their
social network who make allocation decisions in dictator games. In comparing these beliefs to
the actual decisions made by the allocator, subjects appear remarkably unaware of even their
direct friends’ altruism. While they take social distance into account when forming expectations
(correctly anticipating that friends are more generous than strangers) they ignore baseline altruism
(allocations to unnamed recipients) which is an excellent predictor of actual allocation choices
within the social network. Thus it may be more likely that individuals prefer to interact with
friends in anticipation of beneﬁting from directed altruism, rather than because they want to deal
with people they know to generally be very generous.
Additionally, our results put one piece of our motivating evidence in a diﬀerent light: we ob-
served in the introduction that non-proﬁts often allow donors to attach their name to scholarships,
endowments or buildings which might suggest that signaling is also a common phenomenon in
social networks. Instead, these organizations might provide this type of “signaling service” pre-
cisely because it is diﬃcult for individuals to signal their altruistic preferences to other members
of their social network.
Our ﬁndings also provide some preliminary evidence against the notion that friends actively
seek out altruistic friends. Such a strategy would require knowledge about other peoples’ baseline
altruism. At the same, we document in Leider et al. (2009) that friends do cluster by baseline
altruism (i.e. subjects who are altruistic allocators are more likely to have friends who are altruistic
29While the interaction term for the eﬃcient dictator game is negative, the combined coeﬃcient is still signiﬁcantly
positive.
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allocators, and selﬁsh allocators are more likely to be friends with selﬁsh allocators). These two
observations suggest an interesting question for future research: do our friends shape our social
preferences (treatment eﬀect), or do we seek out friends with similar social preferences (selection
eﬀect)? While the results of this paper point in the direction of the former, direct evidence for
the treatment eﬀect could help explain to what extent the distribution of preferences, as observed
in the lab by Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman et al. (2007), is endogenous.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for allocators’ choices in dictator games
Anonymous Treatment
SD=1 SD=2 SD=3 SD=4 SD=5 Nameless
Dictator Game (N=206) (N=286) (N=312) (N=97) (N=4) (N=193)
Ex. Rate 1:3 19.19 16.80 15.14 12.20 12.50 17.42
( 19.64) ( 19.30) ( 18.79) ( 15.47) ( 25.00) ( 18.21)
Ex. Rate 1:1 11.96 10.79 9.39 8.79 6.25 11.61
( 13.53) ( 12.68) ( 11.89) ( 10.25) ( 12.50) ( 12.83)
Ex. Rate 3:1 8.03 7.28 5.66 6.15 0.00 8.31
( 13.55) ( 12.88) ( 11.10) ( 10.72) ( 0.00) ( 13.23)
Table shows averages of number of passed tokens by social distance (OR-network). Standard deviations are in
parentheses. Nameless refers to matches between the allocator and the recipient where the identity of the recipient
is not known to the allocator.
Table 2: Summary statistics for recipients’ expectations in dictator games
Anonymous Treatment
SD=1 SD=2 SD=3 SD=4 SD=5
Dictator Game (N=262) (N=371) (N=401) (N=140) (N=2)
Ex. Rate 1:3 17.08 13.09 12.64 12.46 25.00
( 15.84) ( 14.22) ( 14.84) ( 12.83) ( 14.14)
Ex. Rate 1:1 16.14 13.84 11.15 12.85 22.50
( 12.06) ( 11.77) ( 11.30) ( 11.82) ( 3.54)
Ex. Rate 3:1 13.65 11.94 8.86 11.71 22.50
( 14.49) ( 13.86) ( 12.68) ( 14.34) ( 3.54)
Table shows averages of number of expected tokens by social distance (OR-network). Standard deviations are in
parenthesis.
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Table 5: Accuracy of recipients’ beliefs
Dictator-1:3 Dictator-1:1 Dictator-3:1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pass to Nameless 0.275 0.322 0.162 0.141 0.407 0.378
(0.055)∗∗ (0.075)∗∗ (0.077)∗ (0.085)† (0.074)∗∗ (0.077)∗∗
Pass to Nameless * SD1 -0.149 0.073 0.099
(0.153) (0.174) (0.099)
SD1 7.442 10.570 -1.304 -2.334 6.770 5.805
(3.397)∗ (4.391)∗ (2.126) (2.898) (2.764)∗ (3.067)†
SD2 4.382 4.670 -3.835 -3.959 2.413 2.212
(3.117) (3.143) (1.954)∗ (1.990)∗ (2.334) (2.352)
SD3 3.687 3.855 -2.294 -2.460 3.756 3.600
(3.036) (3.065) (2.016) (2.035) (2.465) (2.471)
Const. 11.831 10.830 13.053 13.402 5.244 5.607
(2.727)∗∗ (2.863)∗∗ (1.895)∗∗ (2.002)∗∗ (2.134)∗ (2.157)∗∗
Obs. 190 190 190 190 194 194
Signiﬁcance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the absolute diﬀerence between the
number of tokens expected by the recipient and the actual number of tokens passed by the allocator. “Pass to
Nameless” denotes the number of tokens the allocator passed to nameless recipients. Omitted social distance is
SD4. All speciﬁcations are estimated as OLS regressions with recipient random eﬀects.
Table 6: Accuracy of recipients’ beliefs
Dictator-1:3 Dictator-1:1 Dictator-3:1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pass to Nameless 0.275 0.291 0.175 0.161 0.391 0.367
(0.066)∗∗ (0.078)∗∗ (0.075)∗ (0.086)† (0.075)∗∗ (0.078)∗∗
Pass to Nameless * Network Flow ≥ 9 -0.048 0.039 0.077
(0.147) (0.163) (0.177)
Network Flow 0.290 -0.106 0.095
(0.217) (0.128) (0.147)
Network Flow ≥ 9 2.613 -1.394 0.642
(3.451) (2.206) (2.044)
Const. 14.773 15.310 11.102 11.041 8.514 8.767
(1.939)∗∗ (2.043)∗∗ (1.297)∗∗ (1.313)∗∗ (1.265)∗ (1.226)∗∗
Obs. 190 190 190 190 194 194
Signiﬁcance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the absolute diﬀerence between the
number of tokens expected by the recipient and the actual number of tokens passed by the allocator. “Pass to
Nameless” denotes the number of tokens the allocator passed to nameless recipients. ”Network Flow ≥ 9” denotes
a dummy variable that equals one if the network ﬂow measure is at least nine. All speciﬁcations are estimated as
OLS regressions with recipient random eﬀects.
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